The antinomies of aggressive atheism by Wilde, L
Original Article 
The antinomies of aggressive atheism 
Lawrence Wilde 
Division of Politics and Sociology, School of Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 
Nottingham NG1 4BU, U K . 
E-mail: lawrence.wilde@ntu.ac.uk 
4 
Abstract The spate of popular books attacking religion can be seen as a 
manifestation of the recoil against the idea of multiculturalism. Religious identities 
are also cultural identities, and no meaningful form of multiculturalism is possible 
that leaves religion outside the sphere of public recognitioimTms paper argues that 
'aggressive atheism' undermines its appeal to reason by refusing to see anything of 
value in religion. It also risks exacerbating cultural differences at a time when 
reconciliation is needed. The critique focuses on the contribution of Richard 
Dawkins and examines a number of tensions within the aggressive atheism of his 
best-selling book The God Delusion. The second part of the paper introduces an 
alternative, a framework of reconciliatory dialogues, between atheism and religion 
and within religious communities, operating not just at a formal or institutional 
level but also in cultural expressions and in the practices of everyday life. 
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Introduction 
The recent spate of books attacking religious faith reflects the alarm felt by 
rationalists at the threat posed to secularism by the resurgence of religion as a 
social power. Not content to criticize the excesses of religious fundamentalism, 
the writers view all expressions of belief in God as an affront to rationality 
and an invitation to prejudice and judgementalism (Harris, 2005; Dawkins, 
2006a and 2006b; Dennett, 2006; Grayling, 2007; Hitchens, 2007; Onfray, 2007; 
Stenger, 2007). For the most part this 'aggressive atheism' is intent on 
attacking religious thought and its influence on society, setting to one side the 
question of what a radical secular alternative might look like. However, it is 
not as apolitical as it might appear, for in denouncing the social power of 
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religion its stance is implicitly hostile to the idea of multiculturalism. Religious 
identity is a cultural expression, and, as Tariq Modood has argued recently, it 
is incoherent to place religious affiliation 'outside' multiculturalism as a civic or 
policy idea (Modood, 2007, p. 30). As such, attacks on religion per se can be 
seen as attacks on claims for the public recognition of all religious identities. 
Multiculturalism involves public recognition for minority cultures aimed at 
achieving the accommodation of difference, and as such it is compatible with a 
moderate form of secularism (Modood, 2007, pp. 78-84), but not with the 
strict secularism demanded by aggressive atheism.1 In demanding the retreat of 
religion into the private sphere, aggressive atheism implicitly rails for a state 
that is neutral in relation to religion, but most societies are deef» imbued with 
religious traditions, expressed in such things as anthems, oaths, constitutions, 
public holidays and everyday discourse. If such a professedly liberal state is 
seen to harbour a bias against minority religions, some of the followers of these 
religions are likely to feel alienated. 
One of the arguments of this article is that the confrontational tone of 
aggressive atheism runs the risk of sayingM) re^rous minorities that their 
cherished religious identities are not respected, with potentially serious 
consequences. This supports the view of Bhikhu Parekh that there is a better 
chance of accommodating difference i f we include religious identities in the 
political process: 
Nothing in human life is an unmixed good and we should not take an 
unduly rosy or irredeemably bleak view of religion. Rather than keep it 
out of political life and allow it to sulk and scowl menacingly from 
outside it, we should find ways of both benefiting from its contribution 
and minimizing its dangers. (Parekh, 2000, p. 330) 
Aggressive atheism, of course, views religion as 'irredeemably bleak', and the 
first part of this article challenges the assumptions on which this characteriza-
tion is based. It examines the internal contradictions and ellipses in its position 
by focusing on the work of the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, whose 
vituperative attacks on religion attracted wide audiences to two television 
programmes on British Channel Four in 2006 entitled 'The Root of A l l Evil ' 
(Dawkins, 2006a) and whose follow-up book, The God Delusion (Dawkins, 
2006b), sold over a million and a half copies worldwide within 2 years 
(Aikenhead, 2008). I focus on Dawkins for two reasons: first, he is arguably the 
most aggressive of the aggressive atheists, and also by far the most popular; 
second, as a renowned scientist, he trades on the familiar contrast between the 
pure rationality of science and the essential irrationality of religious faith, using 
this to question why any special respect should be given to religious beliefs in 
a secular society. I argue that, although aggressive atheism sees itself as a 
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champion of reason, Dawkins' emotive rhetoric and unbalanced diatribes 
undermine this claim. So too does his crude dichotomy between faith 
and reason and his refusal to consider the possibility that theology may have 
useful things to say about human experience and development. In short, his 
aggressive atheism mirrors the unreflective certitude it deplores in religion. 
The second part of the paper outlines a more constructive alternative to 
addressing the differences between believers and non-believers and between 
different types of believers. It points to the need for a widening and deepening 
of dialogues already in development if we are to move closer to the peaceful 
accommodation of differences in multicultural societies in a multicultural 
world. 
Aggressive Atheism 
The God Delusion is the most sustained of^Dawkins' numerous polemical 
assaults on religion. In his threefold schema of religious thought, Dawkins 
describes theists as believers in a God who creates life and intervenes in it, 
deists as believers simply in God as an original creator and pantheists for 
whom God is a synonym for nature (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 18). He outlines a 
seven point scale of judgements on the existence of God which places at 'one' 
the strong theist who claims to know that God exists, and at seven the strong 
atheist who claims to know that God does not exist.2 Dawkins places himself at 
'six', claiming that although he cannot know for certain, he thinks God is very 
improbable (Dawkins, 2006b, pp. 50-51). There are a great many arguments 
and assertions in the book, not all of which depend on the rejection of belief in 
God, but what concerns us here is Dawkins' attitude to those who believe in 
some form of God. I argue that there are three major tensions in Dawkins 
position. The first focuses on his rhetorical strategy, which combines a 
frequently abusive tone with a totally one-sided litany of the failings of religion 
and the irrationality of its followers. The second tension is found in his 
dismissal of faith as evil, a problem that flows from an over-simplification of 
the relationship between reason and faith. This is what Einstein describes as the 
'extreme rationalist' position that overestimates the capacity of scientific 
methods in explaining social phenomena and underestimates the complexity of 
the development of normative frameworks (Einstein, 1984, p. 18). The third 
tension is closely related to the second, for in failing to see anything positive in 
religious thought he implicitly makes claims for science which are beyond its 
capacity to deliver. 
It may seem trivial to quibble at the tone of a polemic, for polemics revel in 
their controversial nature and are designed to raise hackles. However, in this 
case, in which one of the principal objects of attack is the certitude and 
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vehemence expressed by religious zealots, it is surely self-defeating for Dawkins 
to adopt a rhetorical strategy that mirrors that of the position he abhors. 
He protests at the 'moral outrage' and 'frenzied malevolence' displayed by the 
fundamentalists (Dawkins, 2006b, pp. 211 and 214), but he attacks religion 
with the same temper. Rather than employing cool detachment to counter the 
fundamentalists, he elects to fight fire with fire. A much earlier critic of 
religious fundamentalism, Benedict Spinoza, pointed out in A Theologico-
Political Treatise (1670) that the language of indignation used by the 
fundamentalists of his day reflected their inability to employ reason. Spinoza 
links the medium and the message: 
Every result of their diseased imagination they attribute to the Holy 
Ghost, and strive to defend with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an 
observed fact that men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived 
at by reason, but conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by 
the passions. (Spinoza, 2004, p. 99) 
Unfortunately, Spinoza's entreaty to sober reasoning is not heeded by 
Dawkins, who claims that the device of 'ridicule' is the only weapon against 
'unintelligible' propositions (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 34). He then proceeds to 
savage not only religious fundamentalists but also those who hold pantheistic 
or deistic views. According to Dawkins, pantheists like Einstein run the risk of 
associating their position with the 'miracle-wreaking, thought-reading, sin-
punishing, prayer-answering God ' , and, as such, are guilty of 'intellectual 
high treason' (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 19). Similarly the many scientists who 
believe in God on the grounds that the immense complexity of the world 
suggests a creator - deists - are derided as partaking in a 'dreadful exhibition of 
self-indulgent, thought-denying skyhookery' (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 155). These 
scientists, it should be remembered, are not supporting the idea of a God that 
intervenes, nor are they seeking to convert others to their belief, but are merely 
expressing a^strong intuition that the immense interactive complexity of the 
world suggests some sort of unifying principle. The sense of wonderment that 
sparks this intuition is a spiritual feeling, a source of ethical commitment of 
respect for life and nature, but Dawkins' intemperate denunciation closes off 
this area of spiritual needs to intellectual inquiry. 
This closure is not quite complete, for at one stage he admits that he shares 
with Einstein a 'pantheistic reverence' for the natural world, something 'we can 
all trivially subscribe to' (Dawkins, 2006b, pp. 14 and 153), and, indeed, this is 
evident in one of Dawkins' earlier works, Unweaving the Rainbow (Dawkins, 
1998). However, this is not as trivial as he would wish to make it, for it raises a 
number of important issues concerning purpose (what are we fori), our attitude 
towards the unknown, and the relationship between science on the one hand 
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and philosophy and religion on the other. He is keen to have such a prestigious 
scientist as Einstein on his side here, rightly pointing out that although Einstein 
considered himself a religious person, he consistently rejected the idea of a 
personal God. However, in stating that Einstein was 'repeatedly indignant at 
the suggestion that he was a theist' (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 18), Dawkins tells only 
half the story. In fact, Einstein was not really perturbed by the familiar 
criticism from theists that he could conceive of God as some sort of impersonal 
life force. What really made him angry were those atheists who, instead of 
taking his position seriously, rejected any notion of God and 'quote me for 
support of such views' (in Jammer, 1999, p. 97). Indeed he has some caustic 
comments for the aggressive atheists of his day: 
Then there are the fanatical atheists whose intolerance is of the same kind 
as the intolerance of the religious fanatics and comes from the same 
source. They are like slaves who are still feeling the weight of their chains 
which they have thrown off after hard struggle. They are creatures who -
in their grudge against the traditional 'opium of the people' - cannot bear 
the music of the spheres. (Jammer, 1999, p ^ ^ 
This observation by Einstein was expressed out of frustration at the rush to 
condemn him following the paper he delivered on 'Science and Religion' at the 
Union Theological Seminary in New York in 1940 (Einstein, 1982, pp. 44-49). 
Yet out of this came thoughtful and provocative dialogues between Einstein 
and theologians Paul Tillich and Hans Kiing, both calling on the image of God 
as 'symbol' and revealing an unexpected closeness between their positions 
(Einstein, pp. 107-114). This is an example of the best we can expect from 
respectful dialogue, but it is abjured by the close-minded attitude that Dawkins 
displays in treating the pantheist view as 'trivial' and in closing off further 
discussion of what is actually meant by a 'personal' God. 
Not only does Dawkins indulge in ridicule of all who disagree with him on 
this subject, but he uses a rhetorical strategy of multiple anecdotes in which a 
parade of 'clever' men scorn religion and religious people say very foolish 
things. A litany of the bad things associated with religion is not balanced by 
any attempt to see anything constructive in it, and there is no attempt to 
consider other factors at the forefront of modern conflict and oppression such 
as nationalism or the ruthless pursuit of profit. N o w this bludgeoning strategy 
might be defended on the grounds that the book is a polemic, but I would 
suggest that it makes for a rather unconvincing polemic which ought to make 
the reader suspect that the anger comes from an inner dissatisfaction with some 
important aspects of the author's own position. Furthermore, within the 
polemic there is a serious attempt to use a Darwinian framework to explain 
the existence and persistence of religion, and a prejudiced rhetorical strategy is 
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not appropriate for a serious contribution to these important issues of 
anthropology and social psychology. 
The issue of faith is bound up with Dawkins' refusal to accept the 
conventional boundaries between the concerns of religion on the one hand and 
science and philosophy on the other. He rails against the distinction made by 
the late Stephen Jay Gould, atheist and scientist, in his formula of 'non-
overlapping magisteria' whereby science covers the empirical realm and 
religion covers the realm of ultimate meaning and moral value (Dawkins, 
2006b, pp. 54-61). Gould is in a long line of scientists who have acknowledged 
the limitations of science in this way. Einstein, for example, argued that science 
'can only ascertain what is, but not what should be, and outside of its domain 
value judgements of all kinds remain necessary'. Religion concerns itself not 
with facts and relations between facts but only with 'evaluations of human 
thought and action' (Einstein, 1984, p. 22). Of course it might be argued that 
issues of judgement belong with philosophy rather than religion, but it would 
be hard to deny the role religion has played in inscribing fundamental ends and 
values into the emotional lives of individuals a^xr societies. According to 
Einstein, the authority of these ends and values is derived only in the 'powerful 
traditions which act upon the conduct and aspirations and judgements of the 
individuals' (Einstein, 1984, p. 19). This approach will not do for Dawkins, 
who insists that there is nothing beyond the range of science. One is tempted to 
say that this is a misplaced 'faith' in science, but for Dawkins science deals 
only in evidence, and faith, as he put it in his television programme, is a 
'process of non-thinking' (Dawkins, 2006a). In his book he goes further, 
borrowing from the vocabulary of theology by condemning faith as an 'evil' 
because 'it requires no justification and brooks no argument' (Dawkins, 2006b, 
p. 308). There is a problem here, for this rigid separation of faith and reason 
elides some important questions about how we give meaning to our lives -
issues of commitment and purpose. 
I would suggest that it is in the sources of commitment to truth that there is 
shared ground between the scientific and religious viewpoints. Einstein is again 
a useful reference point here, for although he argues that science is concerned 
only with the 'is' and religion with the 'should be', he suggests that there are 
strong reciprocal relationships and dependencies between the two spheres. He 
argues that the urge for truth and understanding springs from the sphere of 
religion, and that faith in the possibility that the regulations valid for the world 
of existence are comprehensible to reason is a 'profound faith' shared by all 
genuine scientists (Einstein, 1984, p. 22). This view is also endorsed by Erich 
Fromm, who uses the example of science in his discussion of faith in Man For 
Himself. The scientist, he argues, does not proceed by making experiment after 
experiment and gathering fact after fact without some sort of vision of what he 
or she expects to find. This 'rational vision' is a necessary part of all creative 
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thinking, and although it is based on observation and study rather than sheer 
fantasy, it is nevertheless a manifestation of rational faith. Fromm argues that 
at every step in the scientific process, 'faith is necessary'; it is expressed in terms 
of the vision as a rationally valid aim to pursue, in the conviction that the 
hypothesis is a plausible proposition and in faith in the final theory, at least 
until a general consensus about its validity has been reached (Fromm, 2003, 
p. 154). Einstein describes the 'religious feeling' of the scientist in a 'rapturous 
amazement at the harmony of natural law', a feeling which is 'the guiding 
principle of his life and work' (Einstein, 1982, p. 40). The general point here is 
that pre-evidential intuitions play an important role in the scientific process, 
and Charles Taylor makes a telling comment against Dawkins' position when 
he points out that 'to hold that there are no assumption^^pPscientist's work 
that are not already based on evidence is surely a reflection of blind faith' 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 835, no. 27, author's emphases). 
Dawkins does not consider the possibility of a rational faith, insisting as he 
does on defining faith by its opposition to reason. His conception of faith is 
more accurately rendered as 'irrational faith' (Fromm^003, p. 152). Justifying 
an assertion or practice by stating that it says so in a sacred text is a clear 
example of blind faith and also an affront to reason, but that is an extreme 
form of faith, and it is possible to identify forms of faith that are not only not 
an affront to reason but are part of the reasoning process itself. Fromm argues 
that we should think of faith as an inner attitude rather than something 
primarily directed at something, and the original Old Testament use of faith 
(Emunah) means firmness, a character trait, rather than the content of a belief 
in something (Fromm, 2003,rc. 149). More recently, Alain Badiou has asserted 
the centrality of 2 m s ^ W t of faith (pistis, or 'conviction') to our current 
philosophical tasks (Badiou, 2003, p. 15). Dawkins displays that sort of faith in 
his allegiance to science, and in particular to Darwinian evolutionary theory, 
but he rejects the accusation that he is a fundamentalist because his belief is 
based on studying the evidence rather than on obedience to a holy book. He 
claims his belief in evolution through natural selection is not faith because he 
knows what it would take to change his mind, and, furthermore, he would 
'gladly do so if the evidence were forthcoming' (Dawkins, 2006b, pp. 282-283). 
However, there is a problem with this assertion. Because scientific discovery 
involves surpassing previous knowledge, it is not always obvious within a 
scientific community what counts as valid evidence. The development of 
quantum physics is a good case in point. Werner Heisenberg, in recounting the 
process through which he and Niels Bohr settled on the uncertainty principle as 
the solution to the paradoxes of quantum theory, states that 'it was not a 
solution one could easily accept', as it involved transcending the conceptual 
basis of all classical physics since Newton. A t times almost in despair, he 
asked himself 'can nature possibly be as absurd as it seemed to us in these 
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atomic experiments?' (Heisenberg, 2000, pp. 12-13). And , of course, quantum 
mechanics was simply too outrageous to be accepted by many world-renowned 
scientists, including Einstein, despite the evidence. 
Although Dawkins trumpets reason over faith, rationality involves the 
formulation of goals, and when it comes to deciding to what ends we employ 
our reason we enter the sphere of morality. This is expressed by Max Weber as 
'substantive rationality', whereby actions are calculated according to their 
efficiency in achieving 'ultimate ends' which inevitably involve some sort of 
ethical commitment (Weber, 1978, pp. 85-86). Although Weber refers to this 
type of rationality in the sphere of economic action, it has a more general 
application.3 Substantive rationality involves a commitment to a goal that is 
not susceptible to empirical verification (or falsification). There is, therefore, a 
tension between the radical doubt at the heart of science and the firm 
conviction that necessarily accompanies scientific progress. This is evident 
when Dawkins brings his own scientific knowledge to the task of under-
standing the spread and persistence of religious thought. In response to the 
theistic argument that the organized complexity of life suggests the work of a 
creator, he argues that natural selection explains how such complexity develops 
from simple beginnings, but he goes much further than that in claiming that 
natural selection 'explains the whole of life' (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 116). This is a 
big claim, and it surely requires not only an element of faith to proclaim it, but 
also a great deal of qualification. As Dawkins readily accepts that there is no 
scientific consensus concerning the origin of life, then natural selection can 
explain only the evolution of life that has already started, and its adherents 
should be aware of its limitations. 
What I take Dawkins to mean by saying that natural selection explains 
the whole of life is that the principle discovered by Darwin accounts for the 
process of the evolution of all life-forms, but even this goes much further 
than Darwin himself was prepared to go. In the introduction to The Origin of 
the Species Darwin argued that T am convinced that natural selection has been 
the main but not the exclusive means of modification' and complained in the 
final edition that he had been constantly misrepresented on this point (Darwin, 
cited by Gould, 2001, p. 85). Darwin was aware of the dangers of using his 
theory of natural selection to explain everything, and applying it to cultural 
change is fraught with such dangers. As Stephen Jay Gould argues, although 
natural selection made the human brain large, most of our capabilities 
and potentials may be non-adaptive side-consequences. The plausible claim 
here is that human cultural change operates not in a Darwinian way but 
rather in a Lamarckian way, involving the inheritability of acquired 
characteristics, a position also held by the historian Eric Hobsbawm (Gould, 
2001, pp. 103-105; Hobsbawm, 2004). Dawkins' extravagant claim that natural 
selection explains the whole of life smacks of the same sort of misplaced 
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certainty which Dawkins deplores in religious thinking, and, furthermore, 
opens the door to positivism. 
Viewed critically, positivism involves the inappropriate application of laws 
developed in the natural sciences to the social world, and this is very much 
what Dawkins is doing when he invokes his 'meme' theory to account for 
the development and persistence of religious thinking. Originally developed in 
The Selfish Gene (1976), Dawkins invented the term 'memes' to denote units of 
cultural inheritance which serve as 'replicators', operating socially in an 
analogous way to genes (Dawkins, 1989, p. 192; McGrath, 2005, pp. 121-125). 
In The God Delusion Dawkins offers a memetic theory of religion, but when he 
begins that account he neglects to inform the reader that 'memes' are his own 
invented concept and instead treats them as though they have the same kind of 
facticity as genes and computer viruses (Dawkins, 2006b, pp. 191-200). 
Dawkins seeks to bring the scientific precision to bear on an anthropological 
issue, but he is actually proceeding in a speculative rather than a scientific 
manner (McGrath and McGrath, 2007, pp. 42-45). Furthermore, the scientific 
urge to isolate and analyse key variables as units is wholly unsuited to the task 
of understanding the evolution of ideas. As Mary Midgley argues, thought and 
culture are simply too fluid and complex to be understood as units, and the 
attempt to atomize culture in this way and trace the reproductive interaction 
between such units is the latest in a long line of discredited attempts to extra-
polate scientific ideas beyond their proper place (Midgley, 2001, pp. 67-84). 
Certainly the memetic theory of religion does little to deserve the designation of 
a theory, and this determination to explain everything through a hyper-
Darwinian framework looks distinctly like misplaced faith. 
Finally, let us consider the consequences of a view that considers religion 
only as a destructive force. In The God Delusion Dawkins admits that the title 
of his television programme, The Root of All Evil, is misleading, because 
religion is not the root of all evil (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 1). Nevertheless, the 
whole tenor of the book suggests that religion is the primary cause of social 
calamity and that without it the world would be a much more peaceful place. 
This counterfactual approach not only ignores other sources of conflict such as 
national, ethnic and economic division, but it precludes the possibility of 
understanding religion as the historical development of human self-conscious-
ness and moral awareness. Religion can be seen as perhaps the first human 
attempt to propose answers to questions about why nature operates in the way 
that it does and how we ought to live together. Rather than seeing reason as 
something that begins when we overcome the superstition of religion, we can 
view religion as a grounding expression of reason. This argument was made in 
the early twentieth century by Hermann Cohen in Religion and Reason, in 
which he stated that reason is the source of religion and can be seen as 'the 
mark that distinguishes man from animal' (Cohen, 1995, pp. 4-7). Dawkins 
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instead inveighs against the nastiness of the God of the Old Testament and fails 
to see the rich ambiguities in the stories about the relationship between God 
and humanity. He mocks the stories of the children of Israel misbehaving as 
soon as God turns his back (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 244), rather than seeing this as 
a dramatization of the human struggle to achieve moral self-awareness. 
Where Dawkins sees only a vengeful God demanding sacrifice, radical 
humanists such as Ernst Bloch and Erich Fromm have detected a message of 
human liberation in the biblical depiction of the unfolding relationship 
between God and humanity. Bloch calls this the 'underground Bible' in which 
the 'Cannibal' version of G o d is periodically confronted and eventually gives 
way to the idea of the 'Son of M a n ' symbolizing humanity's 'emancipation' 
from God (Bloch, 1972, pp. 86, 148, 176). So, whereas Dawkins only laments 
the actions of God in sending the Great Flood, the covenant that follows 
reveals a startling retreat by God, who repents his action and promises that it 
will never happen again. Fromm interprets this not simply as a decisive step in 
the religious development of Judaism, but 'a step which prepares the way to 
the concept of the complete freedom of men, even freedom from God ' 
(Fromm, 1991, pp. 24-25). Both Bloch and Fromm also argue the Garden of 
Eden story depicts not just a wrathful G o d but also a major development of 
human freedom. After all, the serpent is right, for when Adam and Eve eat 
the forbidden fruit they do not die, their eyes are opened and they know the 
difference between good and evil; this act of disobedience can be seen as a 
founding act of human reason (Bloch, 1972, pp. 85-86; Fromm, 1991, pp. 64-65). 
One final example of the problematic nature of Dawkins' flat dismissal of the 
potential of religious thought is his failure to see any significance in Arian's 
denial that Jesus was consubstantial with God, Dawkins asks 'what on earth 
could that possibly mean?', and he dismisses such talk of'essence' as meaning 
'very little' (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 33). Now 'essence' in this instance can clearly be 
understood in biological terms, provided that we run with the idea of God as a 
person. If we do, it is not hard to appreciate the radical implications of thinking 
that Jesus was a man adopted by God rather than as the son sent down from 
heaven. The idea that a human can be elevated to the status of God detracts from 
the power of the authoritarian Father and elevates the idea of an autonomous and 
responsible humanity. The suffering and death of the Son of God at the hands of 
the authorities strikes a chord with the suffering masses, and with this conception 
of Jesus as being distinct in essence from God, early Christianity was a rebellious 
and egalitarian movement. As such, it was a doctrine that needed to be changed if 
the Church was to consolidate itself as the religion of the Empire with its own 
authoritarian structures (Bloch, 1972, pp. 160-164; Fromm, 1993, pp. 42-91). 
These important stages in the evolution of human consciousness are lost in 
Dawkins's diatribe against religion and theology. Indeed, the aggressive atheist 
rejection of all such theological issues as irrational nonsense discourages the 
Wilde 
development of an understanding of the underlying social meaning of religious 
disputes and their relevance for ethical questions of the highest importance. 
Dawkins displays an attitude towards religion described by Charles Taylor as 
'subtractionist', in which human progress involves the gradual elimination of 
degrees of superstitious attachments until we arrive only at the human good, 
which, in Dawkins' account, is the realm of science. However, as Taylor 
argues, being left only with human concerns does not in any way tell us what 
our fundamental goals are, individually or socially, and modern humanism 
displays a striving for justice which is not explained simply in terms of the 
jettisoning of religious belief (Taylor, 2007, p. 572). This commitment to a 
framework of values is common to radical humanism and religion, and it 
invokes a realm of ideas and emotions which are commonly termed 'spiritual'. 
It is interesting to recall that when Marx described religion as 'the sigh of the 
oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless 
conditions' (Marx, 1994, p. 57), he was not calling for the spiritual categories of 
heartfulness and soulfulness to be discarded but rather for them to be realized 
in the social relations of the future. It is precisely on this ethical plane, in the 
striving for social justice, that the concerns of radical humanism and religion 
meet. Aggressive atheism precludes such a meeting, but dialogues of this sort 
are necessary steps in learning to live with difference. 
Dialogues and Multilogues4 
Appeals for more dialogue often appear gestural or trite, so it is important to 
outline what sorts of dialogues are actually in train that provide alternatives to 
theistic and atheistic fundamentalisms. For dialogues to be meaningful, we 
need to be able to identify the specific processes that carry the potential to 
foster greater understanding of difference and mutual recognition and respect. 
Who talks to whom, what forms do dialogues take, in what social context and 
what outcomes are achieved? 
Table 1 presents a framework for this network of conciliatory dialogues, not 
as Utopian scheme but rather as an outline of ongoing but unevenly articulated 
processes. Distinctions are made between dialogues between theists and 
atheists, between different faiths, and within faiths between different 
denominations. For dialogue to be meaningful there needs to be some shared 
ground, and this is particularly true when the issues are likely to evince emotive 
responses. So, while a comparison of religious precepts might form the basis of 
inter-faith dialogue in formal or academic contexts, for dialogue to produce 
reflexivity among those who live by these precepts, the interlocutors would 
almost certainly need to share the same faith. On the other hand, reports of 
discussions between 'experts' at a formal level may trigger responses at 
informal levels, encouraging greater tolerance. In terms of the contexts in 
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Table 1: A framework of reconciliatory dialogues 
Interlocutors 
Theists and atheists 
Inter-faith dialogues 
Inter- and 
intra-denominational 
dialogues 
Discursive 
contexts 
Formal 
Cultural 
Everyday life 
Formal 
Cultural 
Everyday life 
Formal 
Cultural 
Everyday life 
Outcomes 
Deeper understanding o f shared ethical concerns 
Promotion of humane governance 
Mit igat ion o f tensions 
Promotion of peaceful co-existence 
Cooperation on shared ethical commitments 
Marginalization of calls to violence 
Cooperation on shared ethical commitments 
which these dialogues take place, it is important to avoid restricting the idea of 
dialogue to formal meetings or exchanges between renowned representatives. 
What I term the 'cultural' level of dialogue involves the opening up of 
discussion of religiously grounded cultural practices through the full range of 
artistic media that embraces novels,5 films, drama, music and also comedy. A t 
the level of everyday life, dialogues are conducted in workplaces and social 
situations through processes of familiarization that encourage curiosity where 
suspicion may once have prevailed. Often it is children who lead the way here, 
learning at school about the variety of religious expressions and conveying 
this positive interest in different creeds to their elders. Finally, in terms of 
outcomes, they range from the minimal goal of avoiding conflict to the 
maximal goal of a^jSorJal ethic of peace and harmony. Realistically, what is to 
be gained is some form of multiculturalism that is 'much more than toleration 
or the co-presence of mutually indifferent communities' (Modood, 2007, p. 65). 
A few indicative examples may help to show the potential of these recon-
ciliatory dialogues. In terms of dialogues between atheistic and theistic 
positions, from the perspective of social theory the contribution of Jiirgen 
Habermas offers an excellent example. His commitment to communicative 
rationality and discourse ethics elicited a response from theologians, and he has 
responded in a constructive way that not only clarifies essential points of 
difference but also shows some common ground. For example, in an article in 
1991 he sympathizes with the theologian Jens Glebe-Moller concerning the 
difficulties of reconciling secular and religious 'language games', finding 
agreement in the idea of cross-generational solidarity, expressed in materialist 
terms yet carrying strong spiritual overtones (Habermas, 2002, pp. 77-78, 
cf. Glebe-Moller, 1987, p. 112). Later in the 1990s, Habermas engaged with 
Michael Theunissen's 'negative philosophy', a way of conceiving of God beyond 
the idea of a presence, in order to achieve greater clarity on the conditions for 
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communicative freedom (Habermas, 2002, pp. 110-128). A t the same time, he 
discusses the Catholic theology of Johannes Baptist Metz concerning the 
possibilities of achieving a political culture that can facilitate a multicultural 
society (Habermas, 2002, pp. 129-138). These engagements did not dissolve 
differences, but they pointed to hitherto unsuspected commonalities. The 
meeting that produced much greater publicity was Habermas's debate with 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) in Bavaria in 2004, and 
their willingness to seek some common ground was symbolically important. 
Cardinal Ratzinger, not noted for his openness on matters of doctrine, 
nevertheless expressed agreement with Habermas's remarks 'about a postsecular 
society, about the willingness to learn from one each other, and about self-
limitation on both sides' (Habermas and Ratzinger, 2006, p. 77). Habermas, 
champion of Enlightenment rationality, engages with religion because he is 
aware that rationality and morality developed historically in religious forms and 
that religion continues to play a vital role in providing a moral orientation for so 
many people in the world. In addition, he realizes that although philosophers 
and theologians give different descriptions of phenomena, they are nevertheless 
addressing substantially the same issues (Habermas, 2002, p. 126). 
For similar reasons other social theorists who have earned their reputations 
without reference to religion have been drawn to discover the truths in religious 
discourse. Regis Debray writes on G o d (Debray, 2004), Alain Badiou on Saint 
Paul (Badiou, 2003), whereas Derrida calls for a spiritual faith beyond 
religion and theology (Derrida, 1998). Derrida's interest in religious thinking 
has interesting links witfAhe 'negative' theology mentioned above, as Hart has 
pointed out (Hart, 1998, pp. 259-280). This process of 'reaching out' to one 
another from the standpoints of radical social theory and religion reflects 
concern about the evanescence of ethics in a world in which ethical 
interventions are desperately required (see, for example, Blond, 1998; de Vries, 
1999; Keenan, 2003; Davis, Milbank and Zizek, 2005). There remains, of 
course, the dividing line between theistic and atheistic perspectives, but such 
dialogues reveal strong affinities in different approaches to concepts such as 
reconciliation, transcendence and justice. Today the challenges for dialogue 
between atheism and theism cover a number of areas, as Richard Falk argues, 
including an ecological concern for 'wholeness', a concern for human and 
animal suffering, a trust in the cooperative potential of human beings and 
a commitment to 'a pervasive pedagogy of tolerance as the foundation of 
citizenship, nationally and globally' (Falk, 2001, p. 96). 
In the sphere of inter-faith dialogue, the religious idea that seems most 
closely connected to the normative goal of multicultural harmony is that of the 
'universal ecumene', which acknowledges that there is a truth in all religions. 
From this perspective, a sense of universal religiosity can inspire initiatives on 
peace, the eradication of poverty and the protection of the environment. As 
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Susanne Rudolph argues, the deep commitment to the idea that there is truth 
in all religions is incompatible with actively seeking converts, and this is one of 
a number of obstacles, but it is an idea that has already developed a major 
following (Rudolph, 2005, pp. 189-199). In terms of global institutional 
developments, an initiative launched through the United Nations Conference 
for Interfaith Cooperation and Peace in New York in 2005 has led to the 
emergence of the Tripartite Forum for Interfaith Cooperation for Peace. Other 
bodies that contribute to the process of seeking common religious ground and 
defusing differences are the United Religions Initiative, which has special 
consultative status with the U N , and the London-based World Congress of 
Faith. One of the most influential of these inter-faith initiatives has been the 
movement for a Parliament of the World's Religions. The Parliament met in 
Chicago in 1993 as part of a centennial celebration of the first Parliament, 
also in Chicago, and the major discussions focused on a document, Towards a 
Global Ethic, drafted mainly by Catholic theologian Hans Kiing. He later 
developed the ideas into a text, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and 
Economics, which has become an important point of reference for discussions 
of global justice. Here, he invokes the many expressions of the Golden Rule to 
affirm the commonality and longevity of this moral principle, the oldest form 
coming from Confucius in the sixth century B C - 'what you yourself do not 
want, do not want to do to another person' (Kiing, 1997, pp. 97-99). This is an 
aspect of religion that Dawkins i s^nwil l ing to acknowledge; religion has 
undoubtedly been a source of conflict, but religious beliefs may also provide 
the motivation to act towards reconciliation. The Parliament now meets 
regularly, focused on specific issues of global justice, although certain impor-
tant religious groupings are absent from the process, such as evangelical 
Protestants, orthodox Jews and fundamentalist Muslims.6 Besides these 
international initiatives there are many thousands of groups at work in 
communities all over the world, assisting social harmony and working actively 
for social justice (Smock, 2002). A US based study by the sociologist Paul 
Lichterman has shown via a detailed ethnographic study just how significant 
the religions are when acting as civic groups dedicated to healing social 
divisions (Lichterman, 2005). 
Finally, in situations in which religion is associated with aggression, an intra-
faith dialogue becomes virtually the only communicative means through which 
violent fundamentalism may be restrained. It is perhaps the most difficult of 
dialogues to develop, because fanatical sects are aware of the need to dissociate 
themselves from their most closely related denominations. Nevertheless, it is 
only through this discourse that the selectivity of fanatical use of sacred texts 
can be held open to scrutiny. Examples can be found within all religions, but 
here I will mention only a few examples, from Christianity and Islam. Within 
Christianity, Randall Balmer's Thy Kingdom Come provides an Evangelical 
Wilde 
Christian's critique of the dramatic move to the Right taken by the Evangelical 
movement in the United States. He questions the 'selective literalism' that 
places overwhelming emphasis on attacking abortion and homosexuality while 
ignoring other messages from the Bible, such as 'care for the poor and 
opposition to war' (Balmer, 2006, pp. 33-34). In the conclusion to his book he 
contrasts his own reading of the principal Bible messages, emphasizing social 
justice and equality, to the militaristic aggression of the Religious Right 
that continues to ignore issues such as torture and poverty (Balmer, 2006, 
pp. 167-191). Evangelical Christians will never listen to Dawkins, but they may 
listen to Balmer, a former editor of the leading U S evangelical journal 
Christianity Today. Within Islam, attempts have been made by Islamic scholars 
to question interpretations of the religion which support violence and 
intolerance (Modood, 2007, pp. 139-145). For example, Bassam Tibi argues 
at length that the history of Islam reveals a great deal more flexibility of 
interpretation than modern jihadists are prepared to accept. In particular, he 
argues that the shari'a or sacred law is a post-Koranic construction which 
should not be rigidified and proposed as a complete replacement for state law 
(Tibi, 2005, pp. 153-166). He also expresses concern that the current 
politicization of Islam will produce 'gated' communities within non-Muslim 
societies, leading to the alienation of Islam from the rest of humanity (Tibi, 
2005, pp. 269-272). Seyyed Hosein Nasr argues against the modern emphasis 
on jihad as 'holy war', for its literal meaning of 'exerting effort' in the name of 
God has always lent itself to a call for spiritual and social renewal without the 
implication of violence. Nasr points out that even where jihad has obviously 
referred to holy war, as in the defence against the Crusades, strict rules of 
conduct deplore injustice, including attacking the innocent (Nasr, 2002, pp. 
256-272). Nasr aB^argrles for an Islamic defence of human rights and 
responsibilities capable of contributing to the creation of harmony between 
religions and peoples throughout the world (ibid., pp. 275-306). We should 
note here that although dialogue with extreme fundamentalists may be effected 
only within a faith or sect, the content of that dialogue need not be contained 
to 'internal' religious affairs, and An-Na ' im makes the point that it is vital for 
such dialogues to discuss the implications for Islamic identity in modern 
societies, including the right to dissent, and that it be supplemented by cross-
cultural dialogues (An-Na'im, 1999, pp. 110-111). 
Conclusion 
The dialogues outlined above display a commitment to reaching an understanding 
of the meanings and social implications of positions all too often supported or 
opposed in implacable fashion. The combined effect of dialogues at all the levels 
denoted is to challenge negative preconceptions and increase awareness of shared 
The antinomies of aggressive atheism 
concerns. Through the development of a culture of reconciliation, suspicion begins 
to give way to fascination, and social claims based on religious identity can more 
readily be negotiated in a mutually respectful way. 
Aggressive atheism's wholly negative view of the social impact of religion 
allows no space for such constructive dialogue. A standard rhetorical ploy is to 
highlight the worst excesses of fundamentalist religions and warn that any 
accommodation of religious identity in the public sphere will involve a 'return 
to the Dark Ages' (Grayling, 2007, p. 47). Another is to suggest that multi-
culturalism involves a dangerous relativism by declaring that any set of views is 
as worthy of respect as any other. Michel Onfray, for example, is particularly 
scathing in his attack on what he terms 'today's dominant branch of secu-
larism', alleging that in decreeing the equality of all religions and of those who 
reject them it is accepting the 'equality of magical thinking and rational 
thought' (Onfray, 2007, p. 216). Daniel Dennett allege^miat 'some multicul-
turalists' (none are named) claim that people from the affluent world can never 
understand the subjectivity of Third World people (Dennett, 2006, p. 260). 
The commitment to reach understanding between different viewpoints does 
not open the floodgates to fundamentalisms of various kinds, but rather serves 
to draw fundamentalisms into a terrain in which they will not flourish. The 
equation of multiculturalism with an 'anything goes' relativism is a gross 
caricature. Supporters of multicultural societies are committed to the core 
values of inclusive democratic states, and claims for the accommodation of 
religious views and practices will be weighed against those values. The 
outcomes will vary according to the prevailing conditions and circumstances, 
but the commitment to the process of accommodation through negotiation is a 
sine qua non for the emergence of societies capable of becoming comfortable 
with their differences. What is important is the encouragement of a disposition, 
which intuitively seeks to reach a better understanding of positions that may 
seem arcane or even offensive. The intention is not to tolerate the intolerable or 
condone practices that breach human rights, but rather to create a fair society 
which is sensitive to the variety of deeply-held values in its midst, and is eager 
to explore the possibilities for their accommodation. 
Notes 
1 Of the writers listed as 'aggressive atheists' Daniel Dennett may be regarded as the exception here 
as in the final chapter of Breaking the Spell he advocates the development of more tolerant 
dialogues and institutions to break down mutual incomprehension. However, in terming this 
goal a 'Utopian global conversation' he acknowledges how far removed it is from anything that 
might be realized in the near future (Dennett, 2006, p. 329). 
2 This is the position adopted by Victor Stenger (2007), whose God The Failed Hypothesis is 
subtitled How Science Shows that God Does Not Exist. 
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3 In an interesting discussion of Weber's typology of rationality, Immanuel Wallerstein points out that 
Weber draws two pairs of distinctions, between 'instrumental' and 'value' rationality in the sphere of 
social action, and between 'formal' and 'substantive' in the sphere of economic action. 'Value 
rationality' refers to action informed by ethical considerations which is undertaken irrespective of its 
prospects for success, and Weber is clearly sceptical of its prospects in the face of the seductive power 
of instrumental rationality. However, he is far more receptive to the possibility of achieving 
substantive rationality, and this opens up the possibility of subordinating the pursuit of short-term 
individual gain to long-term social goals (Wallerstein, 1999, pp. 141-144). 
4 M o d o o d suggests the term 'multilogues' to describe the overlapping nature of the interactions 
between secularism and religion and between and within religious identities (Modood, 2007, p. 65). 
5 E . L . Doctorow's novel City of God is a good example, for it deals with relationships between 
theist and atheist, Christian and Jew, and between different Jewish affiliations - for a discussion 
see Wilde , 2006, pp. 391-405. 
6 There is also a concern that the Parliament is becoming heavily influenced by representatives o f 
the N e w Age Movement. 
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